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 Sustainability is an area of growing concern for both the cocoa producing countries and the 
chocolate manufacturing industry 
 There is a growing consensus on principles underlying sustainable purchasing practices 
 Industry sustainability practices do not necessarily include sustainable purchasing practices 
 Better understanding of the roles, responsibilities, and motivations of key stakeholders in 
cocoa value chains is required to promote sustainable purchasing practices 
 Support for extending ‘alternative’ trading and pilot projects is required to build on initiatives 
that demonstrate best practice in purchasing can meet economic, social, and environmental 
aims. 
 
With the growth and success of Fair 
Trade, Organic, and other alternative 
approaches to the trade in cocoa products, 
the concepts of responsible purchasing and 
sustainability have entered the vocabulary 
of mainstream purchasers more widely. 
Sustainability is an area of growing 
concern for both the cocoa producing 
countries and the chocolate manufacturing 
industry, and the debate has begun to turn 
to sustainable purchasing and trading 
practices. In order for the benefits to reach 
more cocoa farmers than just those 
operating in niche market supply chains, 
sustainable purchasing practices will need 
to be integrated into the criteria and 
culture of mainstream cocoa buyers. 
This paper builds on recent publications 
and on-going debates from a number of 
practitioners and advocates of responsible 
and sustainable purchasing practices. 
Publications of relevance here include: a) 
‘Buying Matters’, a report published by 
Traidcraft (2006) identifying future 
challenges for companies to align 
commercial and ethical agendas; b) a 
report in 2005 from the Natural Resources 
Institute (NRI) and the International 
Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED) that reviews the 
opportunities and risks in incorporating 
fairness into mainstream trading; c) a 
publication from the Institute of Business 
Ethics (IBE) which outlines the successes 
and failures of supply chain management 
efforts to improve the life of workers 
around the world (Jamison & Murdoch, 
2004). Interviews with buyers operating in 
the European chocolate industry and other 
stakeholders in the UK were also 
conducted from April to July 2006. 
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With a focus on the cocoa sector, this 
paper firstly analyses the evolution of 
sustainable purchasing practices, rooting 
them in the practices of alternative and 
fairer trading initiatives. Using the 
example of cocoa, it then assesses the 
drivers and barriers to mainstream cocoa 
buyers adopting these practices. It also 
investigates the extent to which, and in 
what ways, the mainstream cocoa industry 
is responding to this challenge in adopting 
purchasing practices that move towards a 
more sustainable trading system and 
which may improve livelihoods of 
smallholder cocoa farmers.  
The of this paper is to increase our 
understanding of the approaches of 
different actors in meeting the responsible 
purchasing challenge in the cocoa sector, 
and to ask what may encourage or prevent 
adoption of more sustainable practices or 
new ways of working together by the 
major players in coca supply chains. 
Cocoa value chain governance 
The conventional cocoa value chain1 is 
highly complex, consisting of various 
actors including local collectors, various 
intermediary traders and wholesalers, 
exporters, brokers, cocoa processors, and 
chocolate manufacturers. Therefore, in the 
course of converting cocoa beans the raw 
material will be traded several times, with 
value different stages, at each of which a 
margin is taken.  
The ‘governance2’ of value chains such as 
this is therefore of crucial importance. 
According to Blowfield (2004), Fold 
(2002), and Haque (2004), governance 
structures in the cocoa value chain are 
‘buyer-driven’, where some organisations 
                                                 
1 According to Kaplinsky & Morris (2000: 4) value 
chains are the ‘full range of activities that are 
required to bring a product from growth of a 
primary commodity, through intermediary phases, 
to delivery to final consumers’. 
2 Governance refers to the concentration of power, 
i.e. the institutions, structures of authority and 
collaborators most able to allocate resources and 
coordinate or control benefits from trade in the 
chain. 
(typically multi- national companies, 
MNCs) hold considerable power. Fold 
(2002) describes the governance of the 
chain as bi-polar, i.e. a market dominated 
by two sets of MNCs, chocolate 
manufacturers and cocoa traders / 
processors. Blowfield (2004) defines the 
second group (traders / processors) as 
‘invisible companies’ who hold 
considerable power in the value chain, but 
are less exposed to campaign pressure as 
their operations are generally unknown to 
consumers. Such concentration of control 
of the cocoa market, it can be argued, 
reinforces a colonial form of governance 
that exacerbates the uneven share of value 
through the cocoa value chain. 
Representatives of the cocoa industry and 
major buyers point out that if the business 
community is to better serve the needs and 
priorities of smallholder farmers, there is a 
need for an improved enabling 
environment. Investment in infrastructure 
such as roads and other improvements in 
communication links are required to 
enable better access to often quite remote 
and dispersed groups of smallholder 
producers. This highlights a need to look 
to develop sustainable agriculture 
communities by targeting infrastructure 
issues in rural areas to encourage more 
direct relationships.  
If an intermediary (e.g. a trader or 
processor) is expected to invest in a 
sustainability project, there has to be a 
market to justify capital expenditure. 
Evidence from discussions with traders 
suggests that some markets do exist that 
justify such investment, in particular in 
premium sectors such as Fairtrade and 
Organics. However, a lack of widespread 
consumer pressure or significant demand 
from a manufacturer toward a trader in the 
concentrated ‘bi-polar’ cocoa market 
could heighten inertia among MNCs, 
making such investments less likely as 
neither traders nor manufacturers take full 
responsibility for issues facing cocoa 
producers. The bi-polar governance in the 
value chain, combined with lack of market 
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incentives creates a weak ‘business case’3 
for action on sustainability in purchasing 
practices. 
Evolution of Sustainable Purchasing 
Practices 
In the context of a weak business case and 
the uneven distribution of power in the 
chain, sustainable purchasing practices in 
the cocoa sector have in the main 
emanated from experiences of various 
alternative trading models. These range 
from private sector schemes in response to 
market demands, to organisations that 
have a primary concern for producers 
rather than consumers, and research 
institutes and donor development 
agencies. Probably the most widely 
understood and popular approach is Fair 
Trade,4 particularly the standards and 
certification systems developed by the 
Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO) 
and the practices of Alternative Trading 
Organisations (ATOs). 
FLO aims to improve the conditions of 
trade for organisations of smallholder 
producers of tropical commodities by 
specifying the conditions for Fairtrade5 
production (for both small scale producer 
organisations and ‘conditions of hired 
labour’) and importantly trade 
certification. Fairtrade standards focus on 
the trading relationship, covering 
contractual and price issues. ATOs such as 
Twin Trading and Traidcraft adopt a 
partnership approach and aim to connect 
producers and customers through direct 
                                                 
                                                
3 The business case here represented as a justified 
reason for a business to take an action that will be 
seen to increase financial return to a company 
4 Fair trade, defined by FINE, as a trading 
partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and 
respect, which seeks greater equity in international 
trade. 
5 Fairtrade refers to the specific labelling system 
controlled by the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation 
(FLO), versus the more general Fair Trade, a term 
that encompasses a set of business initiatives that 
seek to provide an alternative approach to 
conventional international trade, including more 
equitable trading relations for producers and farm 
workers (Barrientos & Dolan 2006:6). 
relationships,6 increasing market 
knowledge, and adding greater value to 
the primary product.  
In addition to Fairtrade, other initiatives 
have gained prominence in the field of 
sustainable sourcing. Few of these cover 
contractual terms, although a premium 
price, based on quality or preferred 
supplier status is now being introduced 
into some schemes particularly in the 
coffee sector such as by Starbucks (see 
below) and the independent certification 
systems developed by Utz Kapeh and the 
Rainforest Alliance.  In addition the 
products certified as organic generally 
offer farmers a price premium, dependent 
on market demand. 
Starbucks’ C.A.F.E. practices sets a 
number of standards for producers based 
on environmental, social, and economic 
criteria, assessed by an independent 
auditor (at producers’ cost), to determine 
which producers achieve preferred 
supplier status. Those who meet the 
sustainability requirements accrue a better 
deal for their coffee through the receipt of 
‘outright prices’ negotiated directly 
between co-operatives, private farms or 
traders, direct purchase, and long-term 
contracts of 3-5 years.7 Elsewhere in the 
beverage sector, Taylors of Harrogate  pay 
a sustainable price by asking farmers to 
outline costs of production to ensure that 
the price paid gives farmers a decent 
return.8 A number of other initiatives 
focus on improving quality and promoting 
good agricultural practices to return 
greater value to the farmer. Examples 
include the Sustainable Agriculture 
Initiative Platform (SAI-Platform) 
 
6 Trade relations must be as direct as possible and 
aimed at long-term trading relations 
(www.fairtrade.net); the aim in so doing, according 
to Twin, is so that producers can improve their 
lives and assume greater control over their own 
destinies (Twin Annual Report 2004/5: 2) 
7 See Starbucks’ C.A.F.E. practices at 
http://www.starbucks.com/aboutus/supplier_code.a
sp  
8 Taylors’ principles via 
http://www.taylorsofharrogate.co.uk 
NRET working paper July 2007 3
developed by MNCs including Unilever, 
Nestle, and Danone. This however focuses 
on sustainable production rather than 
trading practices.  
The sustainable purchasing practices 
outlined in Table 1 are ways in which 
interventions or changes in the current 
system can address the issue of the 
distribution of wealth and benefits in the 
cocoa market. One thing that was clearly 
evident from the initiatives investigated 
was the wide range of companies and 
organisations who in various ways have 
demonstrated recognition of the need to 
address issues in commodity supply chains 
by adopting some of these practices.   
The practices and perceived benefits in 
Table 1 are drawn from a number of 
sources, including Fairtrade principles,9 
and also elements from recent policy-
focused reports on responsible purchasing 
such as Traidcraft (2006). They represent 
a set of measures to both shift balances of 
power in trading relations to ensure that 
producers appropriate a greater share of 
margins from the cocoa value chain, and 
to build sustainability in supply through 
the employment of longer term strategies 
that provide enablers such as access to 
credit, market information, and contracts 
that commit beyond one season. 
It became apparent in interviews that key 
stakeholders in mainstream cocoa trading 
sectors are aware of these best practices 
and principles, but do they put them into 
practice? What is preventing or 
encouraging major cocoa buyers in rising 
to the challenge of wider use of these 
practices in the cocoa industry? Factors 
which drive sustainable purchasing 
practices and the barriers to their 
implementation are summarised in Table 
2, see page 8. This was developed on the 
basis of a comparison between cocoa 
chains and interviews with key 
stakeholders in the chain. 
                                                 
9 FLO Standards. Available from:  
http://www.fairtrade.net/sites/standards/general.ht
ml     




Perceived Benefit/s of 
Adoption 
‘Fair’ share of the export 
price of cocoa to return to 
the smallholder farmer. 
To cover costs of 
production and provide a 
sustainable income.10
Longer term contractual 
commitments. 
Assist production 
planning and reduce 
volatility in prices. 
Direct relationships. Build trust and stability 
in the chain. Reduce the 
number of ‘middlemen’. 
Improved access to 
affordable credit and pre-
harvest finance. 
Improve cash flow of 
farmers to purchase 
agricultural inputs and 
cover harvest expenses. 
Timely payments and 
communication with 
mutually agreed payment 
terms. 
Greater trust and clarity; 
reduce uncertainty at end 
of harvest. 
Differential pricing and 
community premium 
payments. 
Creation of greater local 
capacity through small-






Conventional versus Alternative Value 
Chains 
Using value chain analysis as a 
framework, we can make distinctions 
between a ‘conventional’ and ‘alternative’ 




                                                 
10Measured  by use of gap analysis between 
income received and cost of living based on an 
internationally recognised tool such as CREA 
(www.crea-inc.org ) 
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The complexity of the chain, high 
transaction costs associated with direct 
links with producers mean that in a value 
chain such as that for chocolate there is 
not a simple, direct business case for 
action on responsible purchasing for 
individual chocolate companies.  
 
Smallholder Local collection 
point / Assembler
Urban wholesalers / 
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The alternative value chain provides an 
example of how, given a certain set of 
criteria, a chain can work better for 
smallholder farmers. By reducing the need 
for some of the middlemen, farmers may 
benefit from the more direct relationship. 
They benefit through receipt of a greater 
share of the price paid for cocoa, better 
market information, and community 
benefits from the social premium. 
A key question for value chain analysis is 
who holds key positions of influence in 
the chain. In the mainstream market, it is 
the major buyers who have most 
influence. In the interesting case of the 
Day Chocolate Company,11 a purchasing 
strategy that sources cocoa in a sustainable 
manner where the buyer chooses to 
empower others has created a challenging 
benchmark to mainstream buyers in the 
industry.  
Whether real or perceived, concerns exist 
amongst major buyers which means there 
is a high level of risk aversion to dealing 
directly with a large number of 
representatives of smallholder farmers. In 
the conventional value chain it is easier to 
maintain the status quo by passing risk 
onto local exporters and traders who 
engage with smallholder farmers as they 
possess greater knowledge of their country 
and may be willing to take on board the 
risk. For smallholders this restricts their 
chances of receiving a ‘fair’ price for their 
cocoa as competition amongst exporters in 
the market reduces prices, and therefore 
returns less value to the farmers.  
In interviews, major buyers recognised 
that the low value returned to the 
commodity producer is an issue for 
smallholders and claimed to be seeking to 
overcome barriers and develop long-term 
relationships. International traders stated 
that they have some co-operation with 
local partners such as shippers and 
warehouses. If such ventures succeed the 
hope would be that increased levels of 
trust and transparency in trading relations 
would lead to improvements for farmers. 
Nevertheless, in practice despite some 
success in these relationships, major 
buyers admit purchasing directly from co-
operatives accounts for a only small 
percentage of cocoa purchased. 
For both ATOs and representatives of 
trading companies, the structure of 
conventional value chains explains the 
small percentage of direct purchasing, and 
the lack of incentive for major buyers to 
bring about significant change in the 
market. For instance, traders highlight 
difficulties in buying from millions of 
                                                 
11 For an overview of the approach of Day, see 
Doherty, B. & Tranchell, S. (2005)  
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dispersed farmers. The unwillingness of 
certain farmers to form co-operatives and 
poor accountability within some producer 
organisations were cited by traders as 
reasons for limited direct purchases. In 
areas such as West Africa, security issues 
related to civil war, political instability, 
civil unrest, and corruption, were cited as 
constraints to building up trust, long-term 
relations and contractual commitments 
which may promote sustainable sourcing. 
Also it was argued that climate change 
impacts and incidence of crop disease may 
restrict the employment of long-term 
contracts in what are often volatile 
markets. 
Other issues raised in literature on 
sustainable trade such as the power vested 
in certain actors in the cocoa value chain, 
the dispersed nature of the cocoa market, 
and lack of enabling environments were 
seen by interviewees as key barriers. All 
interviewees agreed that where consumer 
demand exists, such supply chain 
challenges may be overcome. However, 
there is widespread recognition that in 
order to ensure security of supply and to 
alleviate poverty, major buyers must be 
encouraged to build on opportunities to 
adopt sustainable purchasing practices that 
address social and environmental issues in 
supply chains.  
Both the Fair Trade community and the 
cocoa industry firmly believe that to 
achieve greater sustainability in cocoa 
sourcing, there is a need to create 
additional drivers (push factors) to create 
significant change in the conventional 
supply of cocoa in order to sustain and 
develop smallholder farming 
communities. One such driver may relate 
to new pressures for implementing 
traceability.  In a number of food sectors 
where increasing pressures for 
implementing traceability systems exist,12 
major buyers are more willing to invest in 
                                                 
                                                
12 For instance, in the horticultural industry where 
systems have been developed to trace products 
back to the site of production as a response to food 
safety legislation. 
systems that circumvent or streamline 
some elements of the conventional value 
chain, making purchasing more 
transparent and direct. Some requirements 
on behalf of importers and manufacturers 
are being driven by food safety 
legislation13 and others from consumer 
demands for wanting to know the origin of 
the foodstuffs they purchase. For example, 
to cater for manufacturers' demand for 
traceable quality cocoa, the trader ED&F 
Man introduced a new division, Corigins, 
to supply high quality organic and 
Fairtrade ingredients to the growing 
natural foods sector.  
Whilst some drivers exist, more incentives 
are required to overcome the large number 
of real or perceived barriers currently 
preventing more widespread introduction 
of sustainable purchasing practices. 
Business has a responsibility to 
shareholders to produce return on capital 
employed in purchasing raw materials and 
producing consumer goods. There is, 
therefore, a need to strengthen the 
business case to expand responsible 
purchasing. 
Regulation may be an important driver in 
this regard suggested some interviewees 
from the Fair Trade and industry sectors.  
Regulation may force buyers to be more 
accountable for social and environmental 
responsibilities, especially in the light of 
ever toughening EU regulation. For 
example, the ICCO predicts that the EU is 
likely to increasingly focus Maximum 
Residue Level (MRL) legislation on 
cocoa.14 Also, more innovation in the 
marketplace will increase the pressure on 
those less willing to make change. Where 
some companies are demonstrating 
success in implementing contemporary 
business management and sustainable 
 
13 For instance, on 1st January 2006 the EU 
introduced a range of legislation such as 
EC/852/2004 – Hygiene of Foodstuffs. To comply, 
EU food business must ensure food safety. Prevent 
contamination through: traceability; and Good 
Agricultural Practice (GAP). 
14 By including cocoa in EU food traceability 
Regulation No. 178/2006. 
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purchasing strategies, others will 
increasingly need to recognise market 
signals and follow suit. Furthermore, by 
‘raising the bar’ of what is an acceptable 
way to do business, ATOs and companies 
such as the Day Chocolate Company, are 
gathering consumer support and pressure 
for changes in conventional purchasing 
practices.    
To more effectively translate the 
sustainable practices and lessons learnt 
from Fair Trade and other initiatives to 
allow more smallholders in the 
mainstream trade of cocoa to benefit, there 
is a need for improved co-ordination 
between private and public bodies to 
overcome complexities and reduce some 
of the barriers in the cocoa value chain. 
Some interesting partnerships and pilot 
projects (such as the Day Chocolate 
Company and the ICCO Quality 
Improvement Project)15 have shown 
effective co-operation can lead to better 
structures and systems that develop more 
sustainable trading and responsible cocoa 
purchasing strategies.  
In conclusion, the experience and 
evidence from recent innovations in cocoa 
sourcing have been recognised by key 
stakeholders in conventional cocoa value 
chains. In order for recognition to be 
converted into wider employment of 
sustainable purchasing practices however, 
further drivers are required to take the 
good intentions more into mainstream 
purchasing channels. Examples of 
regulatory drivers that policy-makers may 
look toward could include legislation to 
encourage major buyers to extend 
‘sustainability’ payments to cocoa 
producers, or to stipulate that 
manufacturers label country of origin of 
raw materials, thereby increasing 
                                                 
15 Information on cocoa QIP projects of ICCO can 
be found at: 
http://www.icco.org/projects/Projects1.aspx?Id=vn




traceability and transparency in cocoa 
sourcing.  Increased donor support to scale 
up and improve co-ordination between 
pilot projects would help to demonstrate 
that responsible sourcing strategies do not 
represent commercial suicide. More 
targeted investment into capacity building 
through infrastructure and communication 
provisions in rural areas of cocoa 
exporting countries could help to develop 
smallholders’ skills and empower 
producer co-operatives, and improve 
enabling environments to assist major 
buyers in extending sustainable 
purchasing practices.  
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Table 2: Drivers, Barriers, and Sustainable Purchasing Practices 
Sustainable Purchasing Practice Drivers Barriers 
‘Fair’ share of the export price of 
cocoa to return to the smallholder 
farmer. 
Increase trust in partnership; keep 
farmers in cocoa cultivation; 
consumer/NGO pressure 
Sustainability of Fairtrade price / 
market; bi-polar control; lack of 
co-ordination; market controls 
price; lack of transparency; local 
fiscal policy 
Longer term contractual 
commitments. 
Appropriate legal support; niche 
market opportunities; manufacturer 
pressure on 'invisibles' 
Mistrust of co-operatives; 
corporate inertia; dispersed cocoa 
market 
Direct relationships. Reliable co-operatives; protect 
brand image; innovative 
companies; traceability regulation; 
demand for provenance 
Distance to dispersed producers; 
lack of trust; no direct contact; lack 
of enabling environments; limited 
capacity and capabilities of some 
producer groups; role of local 
exporters 
Improved access to affordable 
credit and pre-harvest finance. 
Premium quality demand; improve 
storage conditions; micro-finance 
programs in place 
As above, plus quality 
unimportant; cannot deal direct 
with individual farmers; role of 
intermediaries 
Timely payments and 
communication with mutually 
agreed payment terms. 
Premium quality demand; secure 
future supply 
Quality unimportant; lack of 
traceability requirement; dispersed 
market 
Differential pricing and 
community premium payments. 
Urban drift and ageing population; 
producer empowerment; demand 
for premium cocoa 
Raw material cost small to MNCs; 
price inelasticity of chocolate; lack 
of innovative companies; lack of 
large speciality market 
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